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INTRODUCTION 
Warren Joseph is a lawfully admitted permanent resident with four U.S. citizen children.  
He immigrated to the United States from Trinidad when he was twenty-one years old.  Three 
months after being admitted into the United States, Warren joined the military. He served in the 
U.S. Army for eight years, including a tour in Iraq during the first Gulf War, where he received 
multiple commendations.  Upon returning home, Warren began suffering from physical and 
physiological symptoms similar to those experienced by other Gulf War veterans including Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) and depression.  He turned to drugs and alcohol as a means 
of coping and eventually found himself in debt.  In an attempt to make some quick cash, Warren 
agreed to drive a truck containing firearms from Oklahoma to New York.1    
Realizing that he was falling into a self-destructive pattern and needed help, Warren 
turned himself into the authorities.  In 2001, Warren pled guilty to the offense of transporting or 
receiving firearms without a license.  After fully cooperating with authorities, Warren was 
sentenced to probation.  He would later serve six months in prison for violating the terms of his 
probation.  Upon his release in 2004, Immigration officials immediately took Warren into 
custody.2   
For the next three years, Warren would be detained at Hudson County Correctional 
Facility while the government sought to deport him based on his single 2001 conviction.  During 
that time Warren both witnessed and suffered physical and physiological abuse at the hands of 
his jailors.  He was constantly tormented and told to just go back to his home country.  The abuse 
Warren suffered led him to believe that it is not the underlying criminal conviction that results in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Joseph v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 465 F.3d 123, 124 (3d Cir. 2006). 
2 Id. 
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most detainees being deported; rather, it is the physical and physiological intimidation of 
detention that cause most people to self deport.3  
Despite the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that civil detention 
violates due process unless it is reasonably related to a valid government purpose,4 not once 
during the entire three years that Warren spent behind bars was the government required to 
justify his continued detention.  Without looking into the facts and circumstances of Warren’s 
individual case, the government categorically labeled him an aggravated felon whose detention 
was required by law.  The government also found detention appropriate without considering the 
various forms of relief available to Warren due to his strong family ties to the U.S. and status as 
a war veteran.5  Based solely on the aggravated felon label, the government denied Warren his 
right to an individualized bond hearing and refused to consider any alternatives to incarceration.  
Thus, Warren was forced to fight his entire deportation case from behind bars.6  
In 2007, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals granted Warren’s Petition for Review.  The 
Court found that his criminal conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony triggering 
mandatory detention and thereby ordered his release.  Although Warren ultimately won his 
immigration case and was allowed to remain in the United States, the cost was severe. The total 
length of time Warren spent in immigration detention constituted a period of incarceration 
lasting six times longer then his six-month sentence for violating his probation.  He spent three 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 ACLU Seeks Release of Gulf War Vet Illegally Detained for Three Years, ACLU, May 22, 2007 
[hereinafter ACLU Article], http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/aclu-seeks-release-gulf-war-
vet-illegally-detained-three-years. 
4 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
5 See generally Immigration and Nationality Act of1952 §§ 240A, 310, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229(b), 
1421 (2011) (establishing cancellation of removal and naturalization as alternatives to 
deportation). 
6 Becca Sheff, Searching for Justice: Mandatory Detention, Immigration: its our community 
Blog (Oct. 30, 2009, 8:41 AM), http://itsourcommunity.blogspot.com/2009/10/searching-for-
justice-mandatory.html. 
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years away from his family despite the fact that his crime was non-violent and he posed neither a 
flight risk nor was a danger to the community.7  
Unfortunately, Warren Joseph’s experience is not unique.  His story illustrates the danger 
of mandating detention based solely upon broad criminal categories that are loosely defined.  
Warren spent three years in detention based on the government labeling him as an aggravated 
felon, a label that was ultimately found to be inapplicable.  For all practical purposes, Warren 
lost three years of his life for nothing.  Additionally, the failure of immigration officials to 
consider the various forms of immigration relief available to noncitizens results in the detention 
of individuals that is unwarranted under the circumstances.  Like Warren, thousands of 
immigrants across the United States are detained by federal agencies on a daily basis.  Allowing 
mandatory detention without an individualized bond hearing “goes against the fundamental 
notions of due process to which citizens and non-citizens alike are entitled in this country.”8  
Congress however, has only continued to expand the grounds requiring detention during the 
removal process. 
Not surprisingly, the number of immigrants being detained has skyrocketed in recent 
years.  In 2004, an estimated one-third of removal proceedings involved immigrant detainees.9  
Today, close to half of all removal proceedings, about 130,000 cases, involve noncitizens 
pursuing claims from detention facilities.10  As of July 2011, over 33,000 immigrants are 
detained on a daily basis and approximately 2.5 million individuals have passed through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Joseph, 465 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2006). 
8 ACLU Article, supra note 3 (quoting Judy Rabinovitz, Senior Staff Attorney at the ACLU’s 
Immigrants’ Rights Project). 
9 Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FY 2011 Statistical Year 
Book, at 01 fig.23 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy08syb.pdf. 
10 Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FY 2011 Statistical Year 
Book, at 01 fig.24 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy11syb.pdf. 
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immigration detention facilities since 2003.11  Federal officers also induce the additional 
detention of thousands of noncitizens by requesting state and local officials to hold noncitizens 
until immigration officials can take them into custody.12  Out of the total number of immigrants 
being detained, an estimated two-thirds are subject to mandatory detention.13  Simultaneously, 
the number of immigrant detainees without any criminal conviction, who are not subject to 
mandatory custody, doubled between 2005 and 2009.14  
In order to cope with the continuously increasing number of immigrants being detained, 
Congress has allocated approximately 24 billion dollars to Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”).15  This allotment represents a 67 percent increase in spending on 
immigration enforcement over the last five years.16  ICE runs the largest detention system in the 
country, spending about 1.7 billion dollars annually to fund over 500 detention facilities spread 
throughout the United States.17  This number does not account for the approximately seventy 
percent of immigrant detainees who are held in local and state jails under ad hoc agreements with 
the federal government.18  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Summaries of Recent Reports on Immigration Detention, National Immigration Reform 12 
(2011) [hereinafter Detention Summaries], http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/ 
2010/DetentionReportSummaries.pdf. 
12 Christopher N. Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive’s Authority to Issue Immigration 
Detainers, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 173-82 (2008); Fact Sheet, U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Law Enforcement Support Center (Nov. 
19, 2008), at http://www.ice.gove/pi/news/factsheets/lesc.htm. 
13 Dora Schriro, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Immigration Detention Overview and 
Recommendations (2009). 
14 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Detention of Criminal Aliens: What Has 
Congress Bought? (2010), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/224. 
15 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, supra note 14. 
16 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, supra note 14. 
17 Nat’l Immigration Forum, The Math of Immigration Detention 1 (2009), 
 http://www.immigrationforum.org/imiges/uploads/MathofImmigrationDetention.pdf. 
18 Schriro, supra note 13, at 6. 
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As Warren Joseph’s case illustrates, the increase in immigration detention stems 
primarily from enforcing policies that subject ever-larger categories of individuals to removal 
charges and custody.19  First, the deportation of noncitizens convicted of criminal offenses, both 
serious and minor, has become the government’s highest interior enforcement objective.20  
Second, many noncitizens arriving in the United States, including returning permanent residents 
and asylum-seekers, must be detained if charged as inadmissible.21  Third, noncitizens with final 
orders of removal may be detained for extended period of time while an appeal is pending or 
while the government is attempting to effectuate removal.22  At the same time more individuals 
are being placed in detention, Congress and the Supreme Court have limited that availability of 
individualized bond hearings to which noncitizens were normally entitled.23  The result is that 
once a noncitizen is placed in immigration detention, that individual will remain in detention for 
the entirety of the removal proceedings. 
Although both the courts and legislatures have consistently classified detention within the 
immigration context as non-punitive, the reality is that for many immigrants, detention represents 
a consequence as severe as deportation itself.24  Detention deprives individuals of the ability to 
work, attend school, and maintain relationships.  For those noncitizens that wish to contest their 
removability, detention requires that the noncitizen agree to incarceration, for an indefinite 
period of time, while claims of non-removability are pursued.  With limited access to legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, supra note 14.  
20 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, supra note 14. 
21 Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 45 (2010). 
22 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678, 699-701 (2001) (defining six months as presumptively reasonable); 
see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005) (extending Zadvydas to inadmissible 
noncitizens); 8 C.F.R. § 241.13-241.14 (2009) (detailing procedures governing post-final order 
custody review). 
23 See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 678 (2001). 
24 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1476 (2010). 
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counsel, detainees face additionally barriers in presenting effective arguments against removal.25 
The resulting economic, emotional, and psychological harms affect not only the detainees 
themselves, but also their family members who may be U.S. citizens.  Even ignoring the illegal 
and abusive treatment of detainees that Mr. Joseph’s story details, detention forces many 
noncitizens to acquiesce to removal simply to obtain release from custody even if they have valid 
claims to remain in the United States.26 
This article argues that immigration detention, as applied to noncitizen permanent 
residents convicted of certain crimes,27 constitutes a deprivation of liberty that raises serious 
constitutional concerns.  Requiring detention without looking at the facts and circumstances of 
each individual case is inconsistent with Congress’s stated primary enforcement goal of 
removing serious criminals from the United States.28  The overall result has been the creation of 
a detention system that is costly, ineffective, and inconsistent with the Congressional policy.29 
Part I of this article gives a basic overview of immigration law and how its current form 
and structure came into effect.  Part II more closely examines the provisions of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (“INA”)30 relating specifically to mandatory detention within the criminal 
context.  Part III discusses why the classification of noncitizens within a one-size-fits-all 
definition is inconsistent with the purposes of mandatory detention.  Part IV argues that 
mandatory detention, without the availability of a bond hearing, raises serious constitutional 
concerns and suggests an alternative procedure that would allow the release of certain qualified 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Kalhan, supra note 21, at 45. 
26 Kalhan, supra note 21, at 45. 
27 The mandatory detention provisions related to suspected terrorists, raises a whole host of other 
constitutional concerns that is beyond the scope of this article. 
28 Transaction Records Clearing House, Immigration Enforcement Since 9/11: A reality Check 
(Sept. 9, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/260/. 
29 Detention Summaries, supra note 11, at 12. 
30 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1531 (2006). 
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noncitizens prior to a finial order of removal.  Part V examines the current limiting doctrines the 
courts have applied to alleviate the potential constitutional violations.  Part VI argues for 
expanding those limiting doctrines to allow an individualized bail hearing if the noncitizen can 
put forth a substantial argument asserting relief from removal.  Finally, Part VII presents the 
process by which the proposed amendments could be implemented in the deportation process.  
Given the serious practical and constitutional concerns inherent in prolonged non-punitive civil 
detention, mandatory detention should only be imposed on those immigrants who truly represent 
either a flight risk or are a danger to the community. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Brief History of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
The power to create immigration law and policy rests primarily with Congress. In 1952 
Congress passed the McCarran-Walter Act establishing the basic structure of modern day 
immigration law, including the procedures to be used in deportation proceedings.31  Since the 
very first immigration statues were enacted, the Supreme Court has characterized Congress’s 
authority over immigration matters as plenary.32  The laws and regulations that Congress enacts 
pursuant to this authority are contained within a statute known as the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”).  Over time the INA has been frequently amended with major changes 
occurring in 1965, 1980,1986, 1988, 1990, and 1996.33  
The rise of immigration detention began in 1996 when Congress amended the INA by 
enacting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) and the Illegal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND 
POLICY 17 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 5th ed. 2009). 
32 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (finding the power to exclude 
foreigners within the list of sovereign powers specifically delegated to Congress by the 
Constitution). 
33 LEGOMSKY, supra note 31, at 21-22. 
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Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act34 (“IIRIRA”).  These amendments to the 
INA made the detention and deportation of noncitizens mandatory for a sweeping array of 
criminal offenses and facilitated harsh consequences for lawful permanent residents.  A violation 
of the INA may result in a noncitizen being: classified as inadmissible, placed in detention for 
extended periods of time, or forced to leave the country through the deportation or removal 
process.  Over time, Congress has only continued to expand the detention provisions of the 
INA.35 
B.  Overview of Federal Agencies Charged with Enforcing the INA 
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Congress dramatically restructured those federal 
agencies whose functions related to national security.  Recognizing that immigration 
enforcement and national security were necessarily entwined, Congress passed the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 (“HSA”).  The HSA placed enforcement of the INA within the purview of 
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).  Underneath the umbrella of the DHS, the 
immigration enforcement and service functions were divided into three main immigration 
agencies: Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”); Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP’); 
and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”).36   
The two entities charged with immigration enforcement are CBP and ICE.  CBP is 
dedicated to border inspections while ICE focuses on enforcing the provisions of the INA within 
the interior of the United States.  USCIS is the agency in charge of immigration services. USCIS 
handles the various applications for immigration benefits such as processing applications for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited 
Scope of Proposed Reforms,113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1937 (2000). 
35 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2006). 
36 LEGOMSKY, supra note 31, at 2-6. 
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permanent residence, asylum, and naturalization.  It operates through a network of regional and 
district offices located throughout the United States.37  
Although the DHS retains control of immigration enforcement and service, the authority 
to adjudicate immigration claims rests with an agency called the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (“EOIR”).  The EOIR was created by the Attorney General in 1983 and 
continues to remain a part of the Department of Justice.  The EOIR is comprised of three units, 
however, for the purposes of this article only two are particularly relevant. The first unit is the 
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge.  This office coordinates the work of various Immigration 
Judges who are located throughout the United States.  An Immigration Judge’s main function is 
to preside over removal hearings.  The second branch of EOIR pertinent to this article is the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  The BIA hears appeals from both Immigration Judges 
and USCIS decisions.38  
While the above paragraphs give only the briefest sketch of the organization and scope of 
United States immigration law, a minimal knowledge of the immigration agencies and their 
functions is a necessary prerequisite to understanding why mandatory detention of noncitizens is 
so problematic. 
C.  Overview of the Removal Process 
 1.  Apprehension 
Deportable noncitizens can be apprehended at the border or in the interior of the United 
States.  In most cases, employees of ICE or CBP are responsible for taking the removable 
noncitizen into custody.  In many cases, however, federal law enforcement officers or even state 
or local police will arrest a person for criminal conduct and then later report the arrest to ICE 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 LEGOMSKY, supra note 31, at 3. 
38 LEGOMSKY, supra note 31, at 3-4. 
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when they discover that the individual is not a United States citizen.  ICE will then typically take 
custody of the noncitizen directly from the state or local jail. 
 2.  Before the Removal Hearing 
Once a noncitizen is in custody, DHS must decide whether “there is prima facie evidence 
that the arrested alien was entering, attempting to enter, or is present in the United States in 
violation of the immigration laws.”39  If there is prima facie evidence, the case is referred to an 
immigration judge for a removal hearing.40  This is accomplished by serving the charging 
document, known as the Notice to Appear (“NTA”), on the noncitizen and filing it with the 
immigration court.  The NTA informs the noncitizen of the deportability grounds charges and 
states the time and place of the individuals required appearance before the immigration judge.41 
Prompt service of the NTA is critical because it triggers the start of removal proceedings.  
DHS must also decide at this point whether to detain the individual pending a final 
removal decision.42  Under the INA, detention is mandatory for certain categories of 
noncitizens.43  In all other cases the DHS officer has discretion whether to detain the person 
without bond, release on a cash bond of at least $1500, or release on conditional parole.44   
However, release is only permitted if a DHS officer or immigration judge determines the 
noncitizen does not pose a danger to the community and is likely to appear for any future 
proceeding.45  Should DHS determine that pre-removal detention is warranted, the NTA provides 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(b) (2008). 
40 Id. 
41 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2006). 
42 Stephen H. Legomsky, The Detention of Aliens: Theories, Rules, and Discretion, 30 UNIV. 
MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN L. REV. 531 (1991). 
43 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1125(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 1125(b)(2)(A), 1126(c)(1)(A, B, C, D), 1231(a)(1, 2, 
3) (2006). 
44 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 
45 8 C.F.R § 236.1(c)(8) (2008). 
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detainees the opportunity to seek release by requesting a de novo bond redetermination hearing 
before an immigration judge.46  DHS must make both the decision to issue a NTA and a 
detention determination within 48 hours of taking the noncitizen into custody.47 
 3.  The Removal Hearing  
The opposing parties at a removal hearing are the noncitizen and ICE.  The hearing is 
usually held at an EOIR immigration court over which an immigration judge presides.  ICE then 
has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the individual in custody is a 
noncitizen.48  The burden then shifts to the noncitizen to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that he or she is lawfully present within the United States.49  If the noncitizen does so, the burden 
shifts back to ICE to prove the alleged deportability grounds by the same evidentiary standard.50 
If the noncitizen concedes removability or the immigration judge finds the individual 
deportable, the hearing enters a second phase during which the noncitizen applies for one or 
more forms of affirmative relief.51  In this phase, the noncitizen has the burden of establishing all 
the elements required for the affirmative relief sought.52  ICE then has the opportunity to put 
forth any evidence relevant to the immigration judge’s relief determination.  After all the 
evidence has been submitted, the immigration judge renders a decision.  If the judge orders the 
noncitizen deported, his opinion must contain a formal order terminating the proceedings and 
directing removal to a specified country.53  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (2008). 
47 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2008) (allowing an additional reasonable period of time will when there is 
an emergency situation or other extraordinary circumstances). 
48 See Murphy v. INS, 54 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 1995). 
49 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2006). 
50 Id. 
51 See supra note 2. 
52 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2006). 
53 Id. 
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4.  Appealing a Final Order of Removal 
 Both ICE and the noncitizen have the right to appeal the decision of the immigration 
judge to the BIA.  Judicial review of a BIA decision is normally accomplished by filing a 
petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the removal 
hearing was held.54  However, Congress’s adoption of the IIRIRA severely limited the 
availability of judicial review.  While courts of appeals can still review questions of law,55 they 
no longer have the authority to review either removal orders based on criminal convictions or 
challenges to the denial of discretionary relief.56  Also as a result of IIRIRA, the government is 
free to remove the noncitizen before a judicial court has decided the petition for review unless a 
request for stay of removal is granted.57 
II. DETENTION OF NONCITIZENS: DISCRETIONARY V. MANDAORY 
 The adoption by Congress of the AEDPA and IIRIRA in 1996 broadened the applicable 
provisions within the INA that could impose detention on noncitizens.  Since then, various 
amendments to the INA and regulations promulgated by the DHS have only increased the 
number of situations where noncitizens may be detained.58  The provisions within the INA 
concerning the detention of noncitizens pending removal can be found in INA § 236. Section 236 
of the INA outlines when detention is either mandatory or discretionary for noncitizens properly 
subject to removal due to a criminal conviction.59   
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2006). 
55 Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). 
56 Id. § 1252(a)(2)(B, C). 
57 Id. § 1252(b)(3)(B). 
58 See infra Part II.A-B. 
59 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2006). 
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A. INA § 236(a): Discretionary Detention 
All noncitizens found to be removable because of criminal conduct are subject to either 
discretionary or mandatory detention.60  INA § 236(a) states that, “an alien may be arrested and 
detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.”61  
The class of noncitizens who fall under the umbrella of § 236(a) is limited to: (1) those convicted 
of a single crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”) and sentenced to less than one year of 
imprisonment; (2) those deportable for domestic violence and related offenses; and (3) those 
deportable for a federal conviction for high speed flight from an immigration checkpoint.62  
Noncitizens detained pursuant § 236(a) have a right to a bond hearing and are eligible for release 
pending a favorable determination on the bond.63  
Assuming § 236(a) applies, a bond hearing is scheduled and takes place before an 
immigration judge during the initial stages of the removal process.64  The relevant determination 
in a bond hearing under INA § 236 is whether the noncitizen presents either a danger to the 
community or is a flight risk.65  At a bond hearing before an immigration judge, the presumption 
is in favor of issuing the bond and the burden of establishing that the noncitizen represents a 
flight risk or is a danger rests with the ICE prosecutor seeking to impose detention.66   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Id. 
61 Id. § 1226(a). 
62 Gerald Seipp & Sophie Feal, The Mandatory Detention Dilemma: The Role Of The Federal 
Courts in Tempering The Scope Of INA § 236(c), Immigr. Briefings 1, 5 (2010). 
63 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)(2) (2006), see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (2008). 
64 See id. § 1003.19(c)(3)(d). 
65 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2008). 
66 Bradley B. Banias, A “Substantial Argument” Against Prolonged, Pre-Removal Mandatory 
Detention, 11 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 31, 33 (2009).  
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Before the attacks on September 11, if a noncitizen was successful at his or her bond 
hearing, that person was immediately released from ICE custody.67  In the political atmosphere 
following September 11, government officials were concerned that the bond process, as applied 
in the immigration context, would allow potential terrorists to avoid apprehension.68  Therefore, 
on October 29, 2001, the Attorney General issued a new regulation authorizing ICE prosecutors 
to effectively overrule an immigration judge who orders the release of a noncitizen on bond.69  
The prosecutor can automatically prevent the noncitizens release by filing an appeal of the 
judge’s release order to the BIA.  An appeal can be made regardless of how frivolous the claim 
and without meeting the usual standards for a stay pending appeal, such as a likelihood of 
success on the merits and irreparable harm.70  Thus, the noncitizen is forced to remain in 
detention until the appeal is adjudicated; a process that routinely takes months and often more 
than a year to decide.71 
While the regulation authorizing the automatic stay provision may have been issued with 
the intent to combat terrorism, the practical effects are far more wide reaching.  ICE prosecutors 
can now effectively detain any noncitizen regardless of the nature of the immigration violation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Assuming that the noncitizen can make the 10% down payment on the amount of the bond. 
68 See Charles D. Weisselberg, The Detention and Treatment of Aliens Three Years After 
September 11: A New New World?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 815 (2005) (arguing that most of the 
people detained after 9/11 as suspected terrorists were arrested pursuant to immigration 
violations).  These individuals were then held in custody for extended periods of time so that 
they could be interrogated for matters that had nothing to do with the reasons for their initial 
arrest. 
69 The regulation provides: “In any case in which the district director has determined that an alien 
should not be released or has set a bond of $10,000 or more, any order of the immigration judge 
authorizing release (on bond or otherwise) shall be stayed upon the Services filing of a [Notice of 
Appeal] with the immigration court within one business day of the issuance of the order, and 
shall remain in abeyance pending decision of the appeal by the Board of Immigration Appeals.” 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) (2003). 
70 David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 
1003, 1030 (2002).  See also 8 C.F.R. § 3.19(4)(i)(2) (2002).   
71 Cole, supra note 70, at 1030. 
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By its very definition, the automatic stay provision will only apply to those individuals who an 
immigration judge has specifically determined pose neither a flight risk nor are a danger to the 
community.  Therefore, it will result in the continued detention only of individuals found not to 
warrant preventive detention.72   
Section 236 was never intended by Congress to operate as a mandatory detention 
provision of the INA.  Traditionally under INA § 236(a), a noncitizen in removal proceedings is 
“either released on his or her own recognizance or authorized a bond or other supervision 
arrangements, which are imposed by the DHS prior to any involvement by the Immigration 
Court.”73  The Attorney General’s unilateral addition of the automatic stay provision effectively 
transforms INA § 236(a) into requiring mandatory detention. Many noncitizens faced with the 
prospect of prolonged detention will opt for voluntary departure or expedited removal instead of 
waging a long and costly court battle from behind bars.74  While it is certainly true that there are 
some circumstances where a stay of release is warranted, ICE prosecutors should be required to 
show that they are likely to succeed on appeal and that the release of the noncitizen would result 
in irreparable harm.75  
  B.  INA § 236(c): Mandatory Detention 
 In contrast to INA § 236(a), which gives ICE prosecutors discretion over whether to seek 
detention of the noncitizen, INA § 236(c) requires detention for certain categories of criminal 
immigrants.76  Section 236(c) states that the Attorney General shall take into custody any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Cole, supra note 70, at 1030. 
73 Seipp, supra note 62. 
74 See generally Jennifer Lee Koh, Jayashri Srikantiah, Karen C. Tumlin, National Immigration 
Law Center, Deportation without Due Process (2011) available at nilc.org/2011sept6dwn.html. 
75 8 C.F.R. § 3.19(4)(i)(2) (2002).  
76 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). 
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noncitizen who is: (1) inadmissible or deportable on criminal grounds;77 (2) deportable for a 
crime of moral turpitude for which they were sentenced to at least one year of imprisonment;78 or 
(3) inadmissible or deportable on terrorism grounds.79  Pursuant to § 236(c), a noncitizen 
convicted of any one of a wide range of crimes, including simple drug possession, is subject to 
mandatory detention.80  Mandatory detention applies to all noncitizens falling within one of the 
applicable categories, including permanent residents who remain eligible for relief from 
deportation.81  If a noncitizen properly falls within the scope of INA § 236(c), an immigration 
judge lacks jurisdiction to hold a bond hearing.82 As a result, the noncitizen has no right to a 
bond and must remain in detention until removal proceedings have been completed.  
 The only way a noncitizen can avoid mandatory detention under INA § 236(c) is to make 
the argument that INA § 236(c) is inapplicable because he or she is not properly included in one 
of the mandatory detention classifications.83  For example, a noncitizen challenging the 
application of INA 236(c) might argue that he or she cannot properly be classified as an 
aggravated felon because the criminal conduct at issue only constituted a misdemeanor.  A 
noncitizen is not properly included under INA § 236(c) if the government is substantially 
unlikely to establish the removal ground that would otherwise subject that individual to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2). 
78 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). 
79 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B), 1227(a)(4)(B). 
80 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(I). 
81 For example, a person who is deportable for a single simple drug possession is subject to 
mandatory detention, see 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(I)(B), but generally is not barred from relief. 
82 See In re Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1107-13, 1999 WL 1100900 (B.I.A. 1999).  The only 
exception to mandatory detention under 236(c) is if release is necessary to protect an actual or 
potential government witness.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2). 
83 See In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 802, 1999 WL 339053 (B.I.A. 1999) (Joseph II), 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(ii) (2009). 
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mandatory detention.84  Under this standard, as established in Matter of Joseph,85 a noncitizen in 
removal proceedings may challenge the mandatory detention provisions of INA § 236(c) in a 
special hearing before an immigration judge.86  Known as Joseph hearings, these hearings 
essentially bifurcate the bond determination process.87  If the noncitizen is able to establish that 
236(c) is inapplicable, the immigration judge may then grant a bond hearing where the burden 
will once again be on the government to show that the noncitizen is neither a flight risk nor a 
danger to the community.88  However, even if the noncitizen is successful in both the Joseph 
hearing and bond hearing, detention may still be required if the ICE prosecutor implements the 
automatic stay provision by choosing to appeal the immigration judge’s bond determination.89 
III.  THE MANDATORY DETENTION CATEGORIES UNDER INA § 236(c) ARE OVERLY 
BROAD AND INEFFECTIVE AT TARGETING DANGEROUS CRIMINAL IMMIGRANTS 
 
 In enacting INA § 236(c), Congress’s stated purpose was to detain and deport what it 
viewed as a growing class of criminal immigrants.90  To help achieve that goal, INA § 236(c) 
lists a number of activities that can make a noncitizen subject to mandatory detention.91  The 
primary categories are: (1) immigration violations; (2) criminal violations; and (3) terrorism 
activities.92  Fearing that a specific list of crimes would limit the number of noncitizens 
eventually deported, Congress set out broad categories of criminal offenses that could make one 
subject to mandatory detention.  These categories include crimes of moral turpitude, controlled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Seipp, supra note 62. 
85 Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999) (interpreting 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.19(i)(2) and 
1003.19(i)(2)). 
86 Id. 
87 Seipp, supra note 62. 
88 Seipp, supra note 62. 
89 Supra, Part II.A-B. 
90 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, supra note 10. 
91 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). 
92 Id. 
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substance violations, and so-called aggravated felonies.93  However, just as Warren Joseph’s case 
demonstrates, Congress’ lack of specificity in establishing these categories has resulted in the 
detention of individuals who are neither a flight risk nor a danger to society.    
 One problem with INA § 236(c)’s use of criminal categories to determine when 
mandatory detention is appropriate is that the statute uses terms of art unique to immigration law.  
For example, a noncitizen is subject to mandatory detention if he or she is convicted of a single 
crime of moral turpitude the sentence for which exceeds one year.94  Although the phrase “crime 
of moral turpitude” generally refers to crimes involving dishonesty, immorality or violence, 
application of the standard is often unclear as an exact definition is nowhere to be found in the 
criminal law context.  Because of this ambiguity, the question of what crimes involve an act of 
moral turpitude has led to inconsistencies among the various jurisdictions95 only adding to the 
luck of the draw element present in immigration law. 
Even defining a noncitizen as an aggravated felon under the INA has proven difficult.  
INA § 101(a) includes in its definition of an aggravated felony any crime of violence for which 
the term of imprisonment was at least one year.96  While there is no ambiguity that someone 
convicted of murder is guilty of a crime of violence, courts have disagreed as to whether those 
guilty of a drunk driving charge are guilty of a crime of violence.97  Additionally, the grounds for 
being classified as an aggravated felon under the INA are much greater then in criminal law.  
Under the INA, an individual can be categorized as an aggravated felon while only having been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 See generally Norton Tooby & J.J. Rollin, Crimes of Moral Turpitude – The Complete Guide 
(2008 ed.). 
96 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) 
97 LEGOMSKY, supra note 31, at 569-70. 
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convicted for a misdemeanor under the applicable state law.98  For example, in Erewele v. Reno, 
the court held that the crime of shoplifting, traditionally a misdemeanor offense, fell within the 
INA’s definition of an “aggravated felony.”99  Although the noncitizen in that case was only 
sentenced to probation rather then incarceration, the court ruled that the pre-removal mandatory 
detention provisions of INA § 236(c) applied.100   Recognizing the inequities that result from 
these malleable standards, many judges have openly criticized the provisions of § 236(c) and 
have expressed reservations that the INA should be applied blindly.101   
Broad application of the term aggravated felon is especially troublesome because the 
consequences of being labeled in this category tend to be more severe then being found 
removable on alternative grounds.102 Noncitizens who are not characterized as aggravated felons 
remain eligible to apply for asylum, lawful permanent residence, and other various forms of 
immigration relief.  Aggravated felons however are disqualified from almost every provision of 
the INA that would allow them to legalize their status.  
By imposing mandatory deportation for broad categories of criminal convictions, 
noncitizens no longer have the opportunity to show rehabilitation or to present evidence that the 
crime committed was not as serious as the statutory label suggests.  Crime labels are often an 
inaccurate reflection of the range of conduct covered by the label.  Furthermore, given the many 
different ways criminal law is applied across the state criminal justice systems, qualifying for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Aggravated Felonies and Deportation (2006), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/155/. Carlos Pacheco entered the US as a permanent 
resident when he was six years old.  In 2000, a federal appeals court found that he was an 
aggravated felon based on his misdemeanor conviction in Rhode Island for stealing some 
Tylenol and cigarettes. 
99 Erewele v. Reno, 2000 WL 1141430 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
100 Id. 
101 Id.  The court expressed its own misgivings that Congress, in its attempts to deter illegal 
immigration, equated misdemeanors with felonies 
102 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, supra note 98. 
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INA § 236(c) will often turn on the jurisdiction in which the crime took place rather then the 
underlying facts and circumstances. A mandatory detention rule that depends on the length of a 
sentence relies too much on the sentencing and parole policies of different states.103 Therefore, 
any reform of INA § 236(c) should begin by clarifying the applicable legal standards and 
narrowing the classes of criminal noncitizens subject to mandatory detention. 
IV.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CIVIL DETENTION: ZADVYDAS, CLARK AND 
DEMORE 
 
 Detention pending the outcome of removal proceedings often last months or years.104  
Until recently, non-punitive or preventive detention was permissible only where an individual: 
(1) has been shown to be a danger to the community or flights risk;105 (2) is dangerous because 
of a harm threatening mental illness;106 or (3) is an enemy alien during a declared war.107  
However, contrary to traditional notions of due process, INA § 236(c) requires the detention of 
noncitizens without showing any of the factors listed above.  While the Supreme Court has 
upheld the constitutionality of INA § 236(c) when the period of pre-removal detention is brief, in 
order to avoid serious constitutional questions, courts should interpret INA § 236(c) to authorize 
mandatory detention only for those immigrants who cannot raise a substantial argument against 
their removability or a substantial argument that they are eligible for some form of immigration 
relief.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Marawetz, supra note 34, at 1960. (One state may sentence a person to a 364 day definite 
term, whereas another may sentence the person to a one year term with the understanding that 
the person would be released after before the year is up.  In practice, the sentences are the same, 
but because the states use different sentencing formulations, only the person in the first state 
could seek relief from deportation.). 
104 Banias, supra note 66, at 32. 
105 Cole, supra note 70, at 1010. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
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A.  The Constitutional Requirements of Post-Removal Detention: Zadvydas and Clark 
 The Supreme Court had the opportunity to examine the constitutionality of mandatory 
detention within the post-removal context in Zadvydas v. Davis.108  The Court in Zadvydas dealt 
with permanent resident detainees who were being held in post removal detention.109  These 
noncitizens were faced with the possibility of life behind bars because no country would take 
them and ICE refused to release them on parole.110  Recognizing that their detention was 
potentially indefinite, the immigrant detainees in Zadvydas challenged the constitutionality of the 
INA provisions that authorized their prolonged detention.111   
 The Court in that case found that immigrants could not be held indefinitely in the post-
removal setting for two reasons.112  First, the civil nature of immigration detention required the 
government show a “special circumstance” in order to constitutionally validate indefinite civil 
detention,113 and protecting the community and effectuating removal did not satisfy the “special 
circumstance” requirement.114  Second, the Court distinguished the immigrant detainees in 
Zadvydas from earlier cases that dealt with un-removable immigrant detainees.115  Focusing on 
the distinction between immigrants who have already been admitted into the United States and 
those immigrants still seeking admission, the Court held that admitted immigrants have 
significant due process rights.116  In Zadvydas, all of the detainees had entered the United States 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
109 Id. at 684. 
110 Id. at 689. 
111 Id.  
112 Id. at 690-91. 
113 Id. at 679. 
114 Id. at 679-80. 
115 Id. 
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as lawfully admitted lawful permanent residents.  Therefore, their liberty interest was equivalent 
to that of a U.S. citizen.117   
To avoid what the court called “serious constitutional questions,” the Court interpreted 
mandatory detention in the post-removal setting to include a temporal limitation.118  The Court 
authorized post-removal detention only until “removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable.”119  
In order to give lower courts guidance in applying this standard, the Court opined that six months 
was a presumptively valid time period during which removal could be effectuated.120  Thus, the 
Court’s holding in Zadvydas created a temporal limitation for the length of time noncitizens, who 
have been ordered removed, can be held without a hearing to reevaluate their circumstances.121 
The Court’s opinion in Zadvydas avoided “the serious constitutional question” of life 
detention by focusing on the language of INA § 241(a)(6).122  The Court treated the issue raised 
in Zadvydas as one of statutory interpretation rather then a Constitutional challenge to indefinite 
post-removal detention.  The extension of the Zadvydas holding to Clark v. Martinez highlights 
that the decision was statutory in nature.123  In Clark, the Court was once again asked to consider 
the proper application of INA § 241(a)(6).124  This time however, INA § 241(a)(6) was being 
applied to noncitizens never having been admitted to the United States.125  Reversing his position 
in Zadvydas and writing for the majority, Justice Scalia found that INA § 241(a)(6) could not be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 The court needed to make this distinction to avoid overruling prior cases that allowed the 
government to detain indefinitely immigrants who had not entered the country.  Id. at 693 
(distinguishing case from Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)). 
118 Id. at 699. 
119 Id. at 689. 
120 Id. at 701. 
121 Id. at 699. 
122 Id. at 700. 
123 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005). 
124 Id. at 376.  
125 Id. 
	  	   24	  
construed to apply a time limit for post-removal detention as to one class of noncitizens but not 
to another.126  Despite the fact that noncitizens who have not been admitted to the United States 
do not raise the same constitutional concerns that influenced the Court’s statutory construction in 
Zadvydas, “it is not at all unusual to give a statute’s ambiguous language a limiting construction 
called for by one of the statute’s applications, even though other of the statute’s applications, 
standing alone, would not support the same limitation.”127  The Court’s reasoning in both 
Zadvydas and Clark indicates that when faced with a constitutional challenge to immigration 
detention, the Court is more likely to avoid any constitutional concerns by engaging in statutory 
construction of the INA, rather then addressing the constitutional issue directly.  While neither 
opinion dealt with the constitutionality of pre-removal detention of admitted immigrants, this 
issue would come before the court two years later in Demore v. Kim.128 
B. The Constitutional Requirements of Pre-Removal Detention: Demore v. Kim 
In Demore, the Court was asked to decide whether INA § 236(c) violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  The noncitizen in Demore argued that § 236(c) was 
unconstitutional because it mandated detention even though “the INS had made no determination 
that he posed either a danger to society or a flight risk.”129  Rather than challenging his inclusion 
in one of § 236(c) mandatory detention categories at a Joseph hearing,130 Mr. Kim choose to 
directly challenge the constitutionality of § 236(c) in a habeas petition.131 
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127 Id. at 380. 
128 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
129 Id. at 514. 
130 Supra Part II.B. 
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In finding INA § 236(c)’s mandatory detention proceedings constitutionally permissible, 
the court relied on the idea that Congress has plenary power over immigration.132  The Court 
stated that it is a “fundamental premise of immigration law” that “Congress regularly makes 
rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”133  Recognizing that courts should 
typically defer to the legislature over immigration matters, the Court then cited to INA § 236(c)’s 
legislative history.  Chief Justice Rehnquist turned to Congressional documents to support the 
propositions that: “(1) criminal aliens were the fastest growing population in federal prisons; (2) 
removable, criminal aliens continued to commit crimes after removal proceedings were 
underway; and (3) removable, criminal aliens often fail to appear for their removal hearings.”134  
Thus, Congress enacted INA § 236(c) to effectuate and ensure the removal of classes of 
immigrants who are inherently a danger to the community or represent a flight risk. 
The Court also cited the cases of Carlson v. Landon135 and Reno v. Flores136 to support 
the position that mandatory detention during removal proceedings without an individual bond 
hearing is consistent with Supreme Court’s precedent.137  Therefore, mandatory detention under 
INA § 236(c) is not only in line with constitutional requirements, but has always been considered 
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a traditional part of the removal process.138  The seemingly contrary holding in Zadvydas was 
distinguished in two ways.139  First, because the purpose of detention under the INA is to 
effectuate removal and the immigrants in Zadvydas could not be removed, such indefinite 
detention did not serve an immigration purpose.140  Second, while Zadvydas dealt with the 
potentially permanent detention of admitted immigrants, detention under INA § 236(c) is 
necessarily limited in duration.141  Relying heavily on statistics showing that detention under 
INA § 236(c) typically did not last more then six months, the Court was able to distinguish 
Zadvydas.142 
Although the Court in Demore ultimately found INA § 236(c) to be constitutionally 
permissible, it was careful to narrow this holding in significant ways.  Under INA § 236(c), 
immigrants can be detained for the brief period necessary for their removal proceedings if: (1) 
the immigrant concedes removability;143 and (2) the immigrant is only held for a brief period.144  
In the Courts opinion, the restriction of liberty resulting from mandatory detention in these 
circumstances was justified because of the rapid pace of most removal proceedings.   
In applying the standard announced in Demore, the district courts have struggled to 
determine exactly when the length of pre-removal detention, without a bond hearing, has become 
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139 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678 (holding that prolonged immigration detention raised serious 
constitutional concerns). 
140 Id. at 527. 
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constitutionally impermissible.  Some courts have applied a “shocks the conscience” standard 
while others have created a balancing test considering: (1) the overall length of detention; (2) 
whether the civil detention is for a longer period than the criminal sentence for crimes resulting 
in the deportable status, (3) whether actual removal was reasonably foreseeable; (4) whether the 
immigration authority acted promptly to advance its interests; and (5) whether the petitioner 
engaged in dilatory tactics in the immigration court.145  The overall result has been an 
inconsistent application of the law with the noncitizen’s likelihood of success depending as much 
upon the particular jurisdiction as the strength of his or her claims.146  
V.  PRE-REMOVAL MANDATORY DETENTION: THE NEED FOR GREATER 
FLEXIBILITY 
 
A.  Limiting the Application of 236(c): Temporal Limitation and Substantial Argument 
Approach 
 
Given the limited nature of the Court’s holding in Demore, Justice Kennedy and Justice 
Breyer wrote concurring opinions analyzing how they would resolve the issue of prolonged 
detention for an immigrant who is actively fighting removal.147  Justice Kennedy believed that if 
an immigrant is subject to prolonged pre-removal mandatory detention, the principles announced 
in Zadvydas should apply.148  Because an admitted immigrant has rights under the Due Process 
Clause, “a lawful permanent resident alien... could be entitled to an individualized determination 
as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became unreasonable or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Sengkeo v. Horgan, 670 F.Supp. 2d 116 (D. Mass. 2009); Flores-Powell v. Chadbourne, 677 
F.Supp.2d 455 (D. Mass. 2010). 
146 Seipp, supra note 62 (discussing challenges based on prolonged detention). 
147 Id. at 531-33 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Id. at 576-79 (Breyer, J. concurring in part and 
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unjustified.”149  Thus, Justice Kennedy would allow an individualized hearing on pre-removal 
detention for immigrants detained longer then six months.150 
Justice Breyer, in his concurring opinion, agreed with Justice Kennedy temporal 
limitation, but also recognized a second way to interpret and limit INA § 236(c).  Analyzing the 
text of § 236(c) directly, Justice Breyer noted that the provision only allows detention of criminal 
immigrants who are deportable, “not one who may, or may not” be deportable.151 Thus, Justice 
Breyer reasoned that if a substantial legal argument exists as to an immigrant’s removability, that 
individual should be entitled to a bond hearing.152  
Immigration courts could look to criminal bail standards to determine what is or what is 
not a “substantial legal argument.”153  These standards would recognize the government’s 
interest in detention while at the same time protecting a detained immigrants liberty interest.154  
Therefore, Justice Breyer would interpret INA § 236(c) to allow a detained immigrant to seek an 
individualized assessment of flight risk and dangerousness as long as the claim contesting 
removability is: “(1) not interposed solely for purposes of delay and (2) raises a question of “law 
or fact” that is not insubstantial.”155 
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The 9th Circuit subsequently applied Justice Breyer’s substantial argument approach to 
the Joseph hearing context in the case of Tijani v. Willis.156 As mentioned above,157 a noncitizen 
in a Joseph hearing has the opportunity to challenge the underlying grounds for removal.  
However, the individual making this challenge bares the burden of showing that ICE is 
“substantially unlikely” to establish the charges that rendered the noncitizen subject to 
mandatory detention.158  The Joseph standard “not only places the burden on the defendant to 
prove that he should not be physically detained, it makes that burden all but insurmountable.”159  
In contrast to this standard, Judge Tashima in his concurring opinion found that the Supreme 
Court has consistently adhered to the principle that the risk of erroneous deprivation of a 
fundamental right should not be placed on the individual.160  When an individual’s liberty 
interest is at stake, the government must bare the higher burden.161  Therefore, detention should 
only be imposed on those immigrants who could not raise a substantial argument against their 
removability. 
B.  Advantages and Disadvantages of the Temporal Approach 
The temporal approach is most effective in the post-removal rather then pre-removal 
context.  By definition, immigrants subject to mandatory detention under INA § 236(c) have yet 
to be ordered removed.162  Litigation in the pre-removal context is ongoing and the time 
necessary to conclude such litigation will vary on a case-by-case basis.  Thus, while the Supreme 
Court established that a six-month period of detention in the post-removal context was 
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presumptively valid,163 it is unlikely a similar bright line rule could be created for pre-removal 
detention.  Joseph Warren for example was held for over three years and yet the length of his 
detention was not considered to be unreasonable.  A brief review of cases applying Kennedy’s 
temporal approach illustrates this lack of uniformity.164  In addition to the lack of uniformity, the 
temporal test is limited in that it cannot prevent a constitutional violation.165  By its very nature, 
the temporal approach can only be applied after an immigrant has been detained for too long.  
The temporal test does nothing to help those immigrants who wish to challenge their detention at 
the outset of removal hearings.  At the very best, this approach can only stop constitutional 
violations from continuing. 
The primary advantage of the temporal approach is its “safety net” quality.166  An 
immigrant will always have the opportunity to apply for this relief even if he or she does not 
challenge the application of INA 236(c) at the outset of litigation.  Furthermore, if litigation 
continues to drag on year after year, an immigrant can challenge the length of detention even if 
previous challenges were rejected.  The temporal approach provides a remedy for immigrants 
who fall through the cracks and get lost within the immigration civil detention system 
indefinitely.167 
 C.  Advantages and Disadvantages of the Substantial Argument Approach 
 The primary difficulty with the substantial argument approach is determining what 
exactly constitutes a substantial argument against removal.  In his concurring opinion Justice 	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Breyer outlines three factors: (1) the appeal is not dilatory; (2) the appeal raises a substantial 
question of law or fact; and (3) the defendant is not a flight risk or danger to the community.168  
At the outset of litigation, an immigrant is likely to raise every argument possible against 
removability.  When viewed in total, this might make some of the arguments look frivolous or 
dilatory, thereby failing the first factor of Justice Breyer’s test.  Additionally, district courts 
regularly disagree with the B.I.A. and Immigration Judges on detention related issues.169  
Because district courts are less familiar with the arc of a typical removal case, they may not be in 
the best position to determine what constitutes a substantial argument within the immigration 
context. 
 The main advantage of the substantial argument approach is that it would prevent 
constitutional violations from occurring at the outset of the removal process.170  A noncitizen 
falling under INA 236(c) would be entitled to a bond hearing if he or she can: (1) raise a 
substantial question of law or fact contesting the application of the INA § 236(c) categories and 
(2) the challenge is not interposed solely for the purposes of delay.  Unlike the temporal test, 
which only provides a remedy for constitutional violations, immigrants would not have to wait 
the six months established in Zadvydas before challenging their detention.  The substantial 
argument approach would also relieve pressure on the detention system because immigrants 
whose arguments are rebuked at the outset of litigation might be persuaded to accept voluntary 
departure or an order of removal quickly.171  Additionally, those immigrants who do have a 
legitimate challenge to their removal would not be subject to detention preventing both a drain 
on ICE resources and the interruption of the immigrant’s life. 	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 Finally, the substantial argument approach aligns with congressional policy because it 
would not apply to those immigrants most likely to flee; namely, those immigrants with no real 
argument against removal.  The Supreme Court in Demore recognized that Congress enacted 
INA § 236(c)’s requirement of mandatory detention to fix the problem of immigrants failing to 
show up for their removal proceedings.172  However, if an immigrant has a substantial argument 
contesting removability, he or she is more likely to appear at the removal hearing.  If mandatory 
detention applied mainly to those immigrants who could not contest their removability, “then 
removal would likely be quick, complying with the ‘brief’ removal process Chief Justice 
Rehnquist approved in Demore.”173  The substantial argument approach recognizes that 
immigrants without a valid legal argument are flight risks and ensures that those immigrants 
remain subject to mandatory detention.174   
VI. EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE SUBSTANTIAL ARGUMENT EXCEPTION 
 The temporal limitation and substantial argument approach do not go far enough in 
limiting the INA’s application of mandatory detention.  Mandatory pre-removal detention, 
without a bond hearing, continues to raise serious constitutional questions and the Court’s 
limited holding in Demore reflects this concern.175  Additionally, both approaches fail to take 
into account the complexity of immigration law and the various avenues of relief available to 
noncitizens subject to removal.  Given the Supreme Court’s willingness to construe the statutory 
language of the INA in order to avoid constitutional challenges,176 ICE and the courts should 
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interpret INA § 236(c) to permit bond hearings for noncitizens that have a substantial claim for 
affirmative relief.   
Noncitizens who fall into any of the categories set out in INA § 236(c) are considered 
removable.177  However, the INA does not require that every removable noncitizen be deported.  
Several forms of relief from deportation are available to qualified individuals who might 
otherwise be removed.178  Warren Joseph’s case also illustrates this point.  Even if Mr. Joseph 
was ultimately found to be removable, the ACLU opined that his strong ties to the U.S. would 
qualify him for various forms of relief.179  The relief provisions contained within the INA 
address the reality that removal can have severe consequences for immigrants and citizens alike.  
The INA recognizes that while many of the removability grounds entail extreme wrongdoing, 
others do not.180  The relief provisions “reflect the philosophy that even serious misconduct must 
be weighed against other factors, such as long-term residence, or an unusual degree of hardship, 
or the likelihood of persecution in a foreign country.”181  Within the removal process, relief from 
deportation can be analogized to an affirmative offense.  Rather then contesting the particular 
grounds for a noncitizen’s removal, immigrants in removal proceedings will often concede their 
removability but assert they are non-the-less eligible to remain in the United States. 
Justice Breyer’s substantial argument exception to INA § 236(c) recognizes the 
individual’s right to be free while at the same time providing the “government leeway to detain 
those noncitizenss who lack any incentive to press their legal claims, and are therefore the most 
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likely to abandon those claims.”182  While the concurring opinion in Demore only addressed 
avoiding pre-removal detention by raising substantial arguments contesting the underlying 
grounds for removability,183 the same line of reasoning can be applied to arguments concerning 
relief from removal.  Immigration law is somewhat unique in that a noncitizen may be more 
concerned with qualifying for a particular form of relief rather then contesting removability.  
However, the ultimate outcome for the individual immigrant under either argument is the same, 
he or she will be allowed to remain within the United States.   
INA § 236(c) only requires detention of those individuals who are removable.  Once a 
noncitizen qualifies for relief, he or she is no longer subject to deportation.  Therefore, regardless 
of whether noncitizens in a pre-removal hearing contest the grounds of their deportation or claim 
eligibility for some form of relief, either assertion constitutes a substantial argument against 
removability.  
Many of the same difficulties in applying the substantial argument approach, as 
understood by Justice Breyer, would also be present if relief from removal was included within 
this exception.184  Courts and immigration judges might disagree on which individuals are likely 
to qualify for immigration relief.  The discretionary nature of most forms of relief might also 
make it difficult for an adjudicating body to determine at the outset of a removal hearing the 
probability that relief might be granted.  However, putting the burden on the noncitizen to show 
that in the past, similarly situated individuals have been granted relief mitigates this concern. 
The biggest obstacle to including relief from removal within the substantial argument 
exception is that such an inclusion would be stretching the statutory language of INA § 236(c).  
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INA § 236(c) mandates that the Attorney General take into custody a noncitizen who is 
deportable.185  A noncitizen cannot be eligible for relief until a determination is made that he or 
she is properly subject to removal.  Thus, ICE has interpreted INA § 236(c) to require that a 
deportable noncitizen be placed in mandatory detention, irrespective of the fact that the 
noncitizen may qualify for relief from removal.  However, as Justice Breyer recognized in his 
concurring opinion in Demore, INA § 236(c) applies only to those individuals who are 
removable, not individuals who may be removable.186  Based upon the Supreme Court’s policy 
of engaging in statutory construction to avoid constitutional questions, the Court should find that 
noncitizens that have a substantial argument for affirmative relief may be deportable, thus falling 
outside the bounds of INA § 236(c). 
Including affirmative relief within Justice Breyer’s substantial argument exception has 
significant advantages.  Allowing noncitizens to avoid mandatory detention when they are able 
to put forth a substantial argument that they qualify for such relief is consistent with the 
Congressional policy behind INA § 236(c)’s enactment.  The majority opinion in Demore upheld 
the mandatory detention provisions of INA § 236(c) in part because it recognized that Congress 
was properly concerned with: (1) the risk that immigrants released on their own recognizance 
would not show up to their removal hearings; and (2) that noncitizens convicted of crimes, if 
released, are likely to commit additional crimes in the future.187  However, a noncitizen that 
qualifies for relief from removal is in a position distinct from those immigrants with whom 
Congress was primarily concerned.  Just as the noncitizen who has a substantial argument 
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contesting his or her grounds of deportation is likely to show up to the removal hearing, so too is 
the noncitizen who is likely to qualify for relief from removal.   
Furthermore, immigrants who qualify for some form of relief are also unlikely to commit 
additional crimes.  Because most forms of relief from removal are discretionary,188 a noncitizen 
released on parole is unlikely to commit any act that would jeopardize a favorable exercise of 
that discretion.  Aggravated felons and noncitizens deportable on terrorist grounds are expressly 
disqualified from most of the major relief provision within the INA;189 thus, this exception will 
be inapplicable to the categories of immigrants Congress was most concerned with.   
Recognizing this exception would allow noncitizens to protect their liberty interest by 
contesting detention at the outset of removal hearings rather then waiting until the end of the 
process.  In addition to preventing constitutional violations from occurring, allowing a noncitizen 
to avoid detention through this avenue would relieve the length of custody concerns addressed by 
the Supreme Court in both Zadvydas and Demore.190  INA § 236(c) requires that individuals 
remain in detention throughout the removal and appeals process.  Once again, Joseph Warran’s 
case illustrates how the blind application of mandatory detention forces permanent residents to 
endure substantial periods of incarceration even if their claim is ultimately successful.  When a 
noncitizen raises all possible arguments against deportation, including challenging the 
underlying grounds for removal and applying for relief, the length of detention is increased.  
Incorporating relief from removal into the substantial argument exception would help avoid the 
constitutional implications of prolonged civil detention. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Relief from removal is generally in the form, “If A, B, and C, then the Attorney General (or 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, as the case may be) may do X.” Legomsky, supra note 25, 
at 646. 
189 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229(b)A(a)(3), 1229(b)A(b)(1)(c), 1229(b)(c)(4), 1229(c)(a)(1), 
240(c)(b)(1)(C). 
190 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678; Demore, 538 U.S. 510. 
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Including this exception would not only benefit immigrants subject to detention, but 
would also benefit permanent residents and citizens that rely on the incarcerated individual. 
Generally under the INA, the noncitizens who are most likely to qualify for relief from removal 
are those individuals that have significant ties to the United States.  For example, a noncitizen 
may qualify for relief from removal if he or she can show “exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship” to a qualifying family member.191  An immigration judge is most likely to find 
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship when the qualifying family member suffers from a 
physical or mental illness and relies on the noncitizen for support.192  Currently, a noncitizen 
falling into one of the categories described in INA § 236(c), who admits removability, is 
automatically denied a bond hearing and subject to the presumptively valid six-month detention 
period outlined in Zadvydas.193  The result of this procedure is that any application to USCIS 
applying for relief from removal must be pursued while the noncitizen is behind bars.  If no 
exception to mandatory detention the qualifying family member suffers as a result. 
VII. IMPLEMENTING CHANGE 
 Limiting the scope of mandatory detention under INA § 236 will require various 
administrative and legislative changes.  Some of these changes can be done unilaterally by the 
Attorney General or ICE.  Others will require an act by Congress amending the statutory 
language of INA § 236.  Regardless of the mode of change, if Congress truly wants to focus 
immigration enforcement on removing those noncitizens who pose a danger to the community,194 
INA § 236 should be amended and applied to accomplish that goal rather then being used as a 
blanket rule to incarcerate all those who fall within its scope. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(b)(1)(D). 
192 See generally INA v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981). 
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194 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, supra note 98. 
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A.  Changes That can be Made Pursuant to Regulations Issued by the Department of 
Justice 
 
 The Department of Justice should abolish regulation 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2), which 
allows ICE to automatically stay an immigration judge’s order of release pending appeal.195  This 
regulation has allowed ICE to broaden the scope of mandatory detention beyond INA § 236’s 
original intent and has reduced bond hearings before an immigration judge to a mere 
formality.196  The Department of Justice should reinstate the requirement that stays of release 
pending appeal will only be granted upon a showing by the government of a likelihood of 
success on the merits and irreparable harm.  This standard strikes the proper balance between an 
individual’s liberty interest and the government’s need to detain those individuals who are truly 
dangerous. 
 B.  Incorporating the Expanded Substantial Argument Approach 
 The substantial argument approach could be incorporated into the removal process 
without requiring new procedures or incurring significant delays.  Currently, a noncitizen can 
immediately challenge a DHS officer’s custody determination under INA § 236(a) by appealing 
that decision to an immigration judge.  If the noncitizen is detained pursuant to INA § 236(c), the 
application of that provision can be challenged at the outset of detention in a Joseph hearing.197 
Using the existing framework of a Joseph hearing, immigration judges could simply ask whether 
the noncitizen has a substantial argument: (1) challenging the grounds for removal; (2) alleging 
the applicability of relief from removal; or (3) both.  If the noncitizen receives a favorable 
determination in the initial proceeding, a traditional bond hearing would subsequently be held.   
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196 See supra Part II.A. 
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The creation of this expanded Joseph hearing could be done by the B.I.A. on appeal, 
federal courts could do it circuit by circuit, or the Attorney Generally can simply issue an 
opinion enforcing the change.198  However, to avoid confusion and ensure uniformity, the most 
effective mode of change would be to have either the Attorney General issue an opinion 
recognizing the substantial argument exception or have the Department of Justice issue a 
regulation requiring ICE officers to interpret INA § 236(c) with this exception in mind.199 
 C.  Narrowing and Clarifying the Criminal Categories Under INA § 236 
 Any reform of INA § 236(c) should begin by clarifying the applicable legal standards and 
narrowing the classes of criminal noncitizens subject to mandatory detention.  The INA’s use of 
ill defined terms and broad criminal labels as the criteria for determining when detention is 
appropriate has proven ineffective and has led to unnecessary confusion.200 Additionally, the list 
of offenses qualifying as an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43) should be shortened to 
include serious offenses.201  However, amending the provisions of the INA can only be 
accomplished by an act of Congress.  Therefore, Congress’s Commission on Immigration 
Reform should propose bills that tie detention and deportation to relevant criminal standards 
rather then relying on principles that are unique to immigration law. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Congress’s immigration policy has steadily moved toward greater executive branch 
authority to decree that noncitizens that share certain characteristics are uniformly dangerous.  
Immigration detention in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks has seen a dramatic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Bianas, supra note 66, at 67. 
199 The attorney general has jurisdiction to take on a B.I.A. case and render an opinion at any 
time.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i). 
200 Supra Part III. 
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increase in the use of no-bond directives based on categorical presumptions, without 
individualized assessments of flight risk or danger to the community. This tendency has resulted 
in the overuse of mandatory detention.  Joseph Warren, who spent three years in prison based on 
a criminal label that the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals eventually found to be inapplicable, is just 
one example of ICE’s overuse of mandatory detention.202  Given the serious constitutional 
concerns associated with prolonged civil detention, ICE and the courts should interpret the 
relevant provisions of the INA to allow an individualized bond hearing whenever possible.  
Incorporating the expanded substantial argument approach into making bond determinations 
avoids any potential constitutional concerns and is consistent with the Congressional policy of 
requiring detention for those noncitizens that are either a flight risk or a danger to the 
community.   
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